The concavification property of classical preferences has been widely applied in the characterization of strategy-proof social choice functions (SCFs). Barberà and Jackson (1995) proved that if the domain is the set of all classical preferences then a SCF which is strategy-proof and individually-rational must be a fixed-price trading rule. The proofs in Barberà and Jackson (1995) relies heavily on the use of concavification property of the classical preferences. We demonstrate that if a domain of a SCF is single-crossing then Barberà and Jackson (1995) result does not hold. We also characterize the class of stratgey-proof, individually-rational and continuous SCFs defined on classical single-crossing domains.
Introduction
Allocating available resources amongst a given set of agents who have preferences defined over these resources has been a well studied problem. However, the set of rules will typically vary with the axioms that these rules are required to satisfy. For instance consider classical exchange economies. If the rules are required to satisfy strategy-proofness and Paretoefficiency then Zhou (1991) (for two-agent) showed that these rules must be dictatorial. Barberà and Jackson (1995) showed that if the rules are required to satisfy strategy-proofness and individual-rationality then they must be fixed-price trading rules. In this paper, we study allocation rules defined on classical single-crossing domains that are strategy-proof and individually rational. If a social choice function (SCF) is strategy-proof, then no agent can benefit by lying irrespective of her beliefs regarding the announcements of other agents. Individual-rationality means that every agent has an endowment of goods (the endowment vector is assumed to be a common knowledge) and the SCF is required to generate allocations that make each agent at least as well off as consuming his endowment. If an SCF is not individually rational, some agents will presumably "opt out" of the mechanism and consume their private endowments. Thus individual rationality is a minimal requirement that ensures the voluntary participation of agents in the mechanism.
It is well-known that Pareto-efficiency and individual-rationality are incompatible in our model. Hurwicz (1972) demonstrates this for the case of two-good and two-agent models. Serizawa (2002) extends this result to an arbitrary numbers of agents and goods. Moreover Serizawa's (2002) result only requires a domain of preferences that includes all homothetic preferences.
In an important paper, Barberà and Jackson (1995) show that a strategy-proof and individually rational SCF defined on the domain of all classical preferences is a Fixed-Price Trading or FPT rule. These rules have also been shown to be salient in other mechanism design problems. For instance, Hagerty and Rogerson (1987) consider a bilateral trading model with quasi-linear utility functions for the agents and show that a strategy-proof, individually rational and budget-balanced SCF is a FPT rule.
Our goal in this paper is to consider the Barberà and Jackson (1995) problem on an important restricted domain of preferences. A critical element of the arguments in Barberà and Jackson (1995) is the use of concavified preferences. Concavification requires the preference domain to be rich enough in order to permit indifference curves to be "bent upwards" at any bundle in the commodity space. We restrict attention to preferences that satisfy the single-crossing property. This rules out concavification. We show that there are non-FPT rules that are strategy-proof and individually rational in such domains. Furthermore, we provide a complete characterization of such SCFs in two-agent economies that satisfy an additional continuity requirement. Our characterization can be briefly described as follows. An FPT rule requires the range of the SCFs to be piecewise linear with a kink (possibly) at the endowment. We show that for single-crossing domains, the range need not be piecewise linear although it must contain the endowment and satisfy additional properties. We call these rules Generalized Trading rules. An FPT rule with a connected range, is an example of a Generalized Trading rule.
Single-crossing domains have been extensively used in mechanism design and contract theory. Some classic papers in this regard are Spence (1973) , Mirrlees (1971) and Rothschild and Stiglitz (1976) . Saporiti (2009) considers a single-crossing domain with a finite number of alternatives and strict preferences and provides a characterization of strategy-proof SCFs. Our results are independent of his because our models are completely different. A more detailed discussion of the relationship between our models can be found in Section 3. Barberà and Jackson (2004) consider a model where society's preferences over voting rules satisfy single-crossingness. However, their objective is to analyze self-stable rather than strategy-proof voting rules. Gans and Smart (1996) study an Arrovian aggregation problem with single-crossing preferences for voters. They show that median voters are decisive in all majority elections between pairs of alternatives. Corchón and Rueda-Llano (2008) analyze a public-good-privategood production economy where agents' preferences satisfy single-crossingness. They show the non-existence of smooth strategy-proof, Pareto-efficient SCFs that give strictly positive amount of both goods to the agents.
We remark that the concavification property of various preference domains has been used extensively in the characterization of strategy-proof SCFs in economic environments. See for instance, Zhou (1991) , Hashimoto (2008) , Serizawa and Weymark (2003) , Serizawa (2006) and Ju (2003) . Goswami et al. (2011) , show that some results in the literature on strategyproofness and Pareto-efficiency carry over exactly to domains where concavification is not permitted. However, the present paper demonstrates that a similar conclusion does not obtain when Pareto-efficiency is replaced by individual-rationality. In particular, a strictly larger class than FPT rules will satisfy strategy-proofness and individual-rationality. This paper is organized as follows. Section 2 sets up the notation, the definition of an FPT rule and the fundamental Barberà and Jackson (1995) characterization result. Section 3 introduces concavification, single-crossing domains and some preliminary but useful results pertaining to this domain. A subsection of this section compares our concept of singlecrossingness with that of Saporiti (2009) . Section 4 provides examples of non-FPT rules that are strategy-proof and individually rational and Section 5 contains the main characterization result. Section 6 concludes.
Notation and Definitions
Throughout this paper, we will restrict attention to a two-agent, two-good model. We denote the set of agents by I = {1, 2} and the two goods by x and y. The set of goods is denoted by M . Each agent i has an endowment ω Let Ω = (Ω x , Ω y ) denote the total endowment in the economy. Then define the set of feasible allocations to be ∆ = {((x 1 , y 1 ), (x 2 , y 2 ))| x 1 + x 2 = Ω x and y 1 + y 2 = Ω y ; x i ≥ 0, y i ≥ 0, for all i ∈ I}.
A preference ordering for agent i, R i is a complete, reflexive and transitive ordering of the elements of 2 + . We say that R i is classical if it is (a) continuous, (b) strictly monotonic in 2 ++ and (c) the upper contour sets are strictly convex in 2 ++ 1 . We consider only classical preferences and denote the set of such preferences by
is the set of commodity bundles that are at least as good as (x i , y i ) according to R i and LC(R i , (x i , y i )) is the set of commodity bundles that are no better than (x i , y i ) according to R i . An indifference curve for preference R i through a bundle
The range of an SCF F will be denoted by F . We now introduce some important but standard definitions.
It is Strategy-Proof if it is not manipulable by any agent at any profile. Equivalently F is strategy-proof if
In the usual strategic voting model, an agent's preference ordering is private information and F represents the mechanism designer's objectives. If F is strategy-proof, all agent has dominant-strategy incentives to reveal their private information truthfully.
Definition 2 An allocation x ∈ ∆ is Pareto-Efficient at profile R if there does not exist another allocation x ∈ ∆ such that x i R i x i for all i ∈ I and x j P j x j for some j ∈ I.
Let P E(R) denote the collection of Pareto-Efficient allocations at the profile R. Individualrationality is defined below: it ensures that an agent is not made worse-off relative to his endowment by F .
Definition 3 An SCF F : [D]
2 → ∆ satisfies Individual-Rationality (IR) with respect to ω, if
2 .
1 For a preference ordering R i and a vector x ∈ 2 + , the upper contour set of R i at x is denoted by U C (R i , x) and is the set {z ∈ 2 + |zR i x}. Similarly the lower contour set of R i at x is denoted by LC (R i , x) and is the set {z ∈ 2 + |xR i z}. A preference ordering R i is continuous if U C (R i , x) and LC(R i , x) are both closed for all x ∈ 2 + . A preference ordering R i is strictly convex if U C(R i , x) is strictly convex for all x ∈ 2 ++ . For x, z ∈ 2 + by x > z we mean x k ≥ z k for all k ∈ M and x k > z k for some k. A preference ordering is strictly monotonic in
Our next goal is to introduce FPT rules. We closely follow the notation and definitions in Barberà and Jackson (1995) . Consider a ∈ ∆ and let a i = (x i , y i ). 
If agent i has multiple tops in a set under R i and if the choice of the tops varies when agent j changes his announced preference ordering, then it should vary in such a way that agent j cannot manipulate.
2 → ∆ is an FPT rule if F is closed, diagonal and contains ω and there exists an agent i such that the following hold:
There exist tie-breaking rules t i and t j such that t i is j-favorable at F and t j is
2 Recall the following notation: for all p, q ∈ 2 , p ≥ q if p j ≥ q j for all j ∈ {1, 2} and p q if p j > q j for all j ∈ {1, 2}.
3 Of course, T op(R i ; B, R j ) does not depend on R j ; however as we shall see, this notation helps in defining the tie-breaking rule for FPT rules. Later in the paper while describing our results, we will drop R j from the notation because tie-breaking is not required in our characterization.
The first condition ensures that F contains ω and is piecewise linear with a possible kink at ω, as depicted in Figure 1 . If any two feasible allocations a and b lie on the same side of the endowment then ω, a and b are collinear. Since the indifference curves of classical preferences are strictly convex, both agents' preferences are single-peaked on each the line segment if F is connected.
Theorem 1 Barberà and Jackson (1995) We end this section by introducing further notation that will be used subsequently. Consider an allocation (x , y ). We let F IQ i (x , y ), SEQ i (x , y ) T HQ i (x , y ) and F OQ i (x , y ) denote the first, second, third and fourth quadrants of (x , y ) from i's perspective. Specifically, 
Concavification and Single-Crossing Domains
We first introduce the notion of concavification.
Definition 6 Let R i be a preference ordering and let
In Figure 2 Panel A, R i is a concavification of R i at (x i , y i ). The indifference curve of R i touches the indifference curve of R i at (x i , y i ) and lies strictly above it at all other bundles. In other words, the indifference curve of R i at (x i , y i ) can be "bent upwards" at (
The domain D
c is an example of a domain that admits concavification. An example of a "smaller" domain that also admits concavification is provided below.
Example 1 Consider the domain represented by the utility function
Note that this domain consists of classical preferences; moreover all preferences in the domain are smooth. Fix an utility function (θ i , α i ) and a consumption bundle (
, where θ i < θ i . Now consider the case where x * i > 0. Then the absolute value of the slope of an indifference curve at (
, slopes of the two utility functions at (x * i , y * i ) are equal. We can write the equality as
. This establishes our claim.
The results in Barberà and Jackson (1995) depend heavily on the concavification property of the domain D c . Our objective in this paper is to analyze the structure of strategy-proof and individually rational SCFs over a class of domains that do not admit concavification.
The domain that we focus on satisfies the single-crossing property. This property requires that two different indifference curves never "touch" each other that is either they cut each other from above or from below. Thus, the situation in Panel A never occurs and we always have the situation in Panel B occurring. This is defined formally below.
IC(R
If (1) above holds then we say R i cuts R i from above at (x i , y i ); if (2) holds then we say R i cuts R i from below at (x i , y i ).
Consider two indifference curves IC(R
The definition of single-crossing rules out the situation in Panel A because IC(R i , (x i , y i )) is above the indifference curve IC(R i , (x i , y i )) both to the left and right of (x i , y i ). Thus, neither (1) nor (2) in Definition 8 hold. Importantly, the situation in Panel C cannot hold either. This is because to the right of (x i , y i ), IC(R i , (x i , y i )) lies both below and above IC(R i , (x i , y i )), so (1) in Definition 8 fails to hold. We record this below as an observation for future reference.
The notation int B refers to the interior of the set B.
IC(R
We provide some examples of single-crossing domains.
Example 2 Consider preferences represented by utility functions of the form
We claim that the this domain is single-crossing. Note that preferences are classical and smooth. The slope of an indifference curve is given by
for all x i > 0. Thus, at a given bundle (x i , y i ), the slope of an indifference curve is described uniquely by the parameter
Notice that the absolute value of the slope of IC(θ i , (x i , y i )) is higher than IC(θ i , (x i , y i )) at (x i , y i ). If either Condition 1 or 2 in Definition 8 is violated, then smoothness would imply that θ i < θ i which is a contradiction. Hence, the domain is single-crossing.
In Example 2, preferences are quasi-linear. We also provide an example of a domain consisting of homothetic preferences that is single-crossing.
Example 3 Consider preferences represented by utility functions of the form
Note that we do not have to consider consumption bundles where either x i = 0 or y i = 0. For all other consumption bundles the slope of an indifference curve is given by
. If α i = α i then the slopes are different at any (x i , y i ). The domain is single-crossing for the same reasons outlined in the previous example.
In the next section we will describe some important properties of single-crossing domains that will be useful in our characterization.
Some Properties of Single-crossing Domains
We first obtain some restrictions on preferences over triples implied by the single-crossing property.
For any a, b, c ∈ ∆, define the following sets of preference orderings over a, b, c.
We will show that if a domain is single-crossing, then three diagonal allocations can be chosen in such a way that all possible preference orderings over these allocations are either from D 1 ({a, b, c}) for one agent and from D 2 ({a, b, c}) for the other.
Proof : We follow the proof in Figure 3 . 
Remark 3.1: The above proposition reveals that over a triple of allocations in the interior of an Edgeworth box, classical single-crosssing preferences impose a restriction on the possible preference orderings over the triple that can arise. In particular, single-crossing preferences impose more restriction on the possible preference ordering over the triple for one of the agents. Bordes et al. (1995) show that the classical preferences in general, impose more restrictions of one agent relative to the other agent, on the possible preference orderings over triples. For instance, Bordes et al. (1995) show if over a triple one agent's preferences admit all possible preferences orderings, then for the other agent it has to be strictly less than the all the orderings.
Proposition 1 specifies the restriction on preferences arising due to the single-crossing property. However, all preferences in (
) pair need not be present in an arbitrary single-crossing domain. We will impose a richness requirement on the singlecrossing domains that ensures that we can pick the a, b, c triple in such a way that all preferences in (
) pair are present in the domain. The definition of richness is given below.
Definition 9 The single-crossing domain D s is Rich if for all diagonal allocations
A single-crossing domain is rich if any two diagonal bundles can be joined by an indifference curve. We show that the domains specified in Examples 2 and 3 earlier are rich.
Example 2 (Continued) Consider the domain introduced in Example 2. We have already seen that this domain is a single-crossing domain. Let (
Hence (x i , y i ) and (x i , y i ) lie on the indifference curve corresponding to θ i . Therefore the domain is rich.
Example 3 (Continued) Consider the domain introduced in Example 3. We have already seen that this is a single-crossing domain. Let (
. Since ln is a strictly increasing function, α i > 0. Therefore,
and (x i , y i ) are on the same indifference curve corresponding to α i . Therefore this domain is rich.
We now define maximal single-crossing domain. It says that a domain of single-crossing preferences is single-crossing if any superset of this domain is not single-crossing.
Definition 10 Let D be a domain of single-crossing preferences. We say D is maximal single-crossing if it is not possible to add any preference to D and still have a single-crossing domain.
An important implication of richness is that a rich single-crossing domain is also a maximal single-crossing domain. We formalize this below.
In the next Lemma we show that if a domain of single-crossing preferences is rich, we can find allocations a, b, c with c > i b > i a (as in Figure 3) 9 , such that all preferences ordering from the pair (
Proof : Choose R * j and fix an indifference curve. Now pick R i and an indifference curve of R i such that it is tangent to the chosen indifference curve of R * j in the interior of ∆. Label the tangency point as b. Then choose a and c on the indifference curve of R * j such that bP i cI i a. Also choose R j such that IC(R j , b) cuts IC(R * j , b) from above. By richness, such an R j exists. Since the domain is single-crossing, we have aP j bP j c.
10 Also choose {a, b, c}) . For instance, choose R i whose indifference curve passes through a and some allocation between b and c. This results in bP i aP i c. Choose R i to be such that agent i is indifferent between a and b. This gives bI i aP i c. Similarly, all other preference orderings in D 1 ({a, b, c}) can be constructed.
9 Let a and b be two diagonal allocations. Fix an agent i. We say
The usual definition of single-peaked preferences apply on a diagonal set according to this order. For instance, if a diagonal set is a straight line segment and lies in the interior of ∆, then all the allocations on it can be sustained as tops for some preference ordering from D s (this follows from arguments similar to Proposition 4). Also, on both sides of the top, the allocation nearer (note that under the order, distance between two allocations can be defined in the Euclidean sense) to it are preferred to the one which is further.
10 Note that we are using the order over a, b and c for this inference.
We will use the sets D 1 ({a, b, c}) and D 2 ({a, b, c}) to construct SCFs that are not FPT rules.
Our next goal is to show that an order relation can be defined on an arbitrary singlecrossing domain D s . The next Proposition is crucial for that purpose.
Proof : We prove the Proposition in four steps.
Step 1: We show that an indifference curve ofR i that cuts the indifference curve ofR i that contains (x * i , y * i ) must cut from below. By way of contradiction, suppose that an indifference curve ofR i cuts the indifference curve ofR i that contains (
Step 2: Let E = {(x i , y i )|y i = y * i , x i ≥ 0}. We will show that the indifference curves of R i must cut the indifference curves ofR i at all the bundles in E from above. For the purpose of contradiction, consider (
) from below (resp.above) then Step 1 and the continuity of preferences imply that there is a neighborhood N (
) from below (resp.above) for allx i ∈ N (x i ). Call this the "openness property". Let x i be the largest value of
By the openness property and our assumption that IC(
) from below but it cannot cut from above either otherwise the openness property will be violated. An analogous argument can be used when x * * i < x * i . Figure 4 below is helpful in understanding this argument. In the figure, the darker indifference curves representR i and the lighter onesR i .
Step 3: Consider the subset
Using the same argument as above it follows that indifference curves ofR i must cut the indifference curves ofR i at all the bundles of E from above.
Step 4: From Step 2 and Step 3 it follows that along every horizontal and vertical line, the indifference curves ofR i must cut the indifference curves ofR i at all the bundles from from above. This establishes the Proposition.
We say R i R i if the indifference curves of R i cut the indifference curves of R i from above at all bundles. Proposition 3 ensures that the order is well-defined.
The following Lemma describes an important set theoretic feature of a single-crossing domain which is rich. ((x i , y i ) ) excluding the end points. Let the arc intersect the vertical axis through (x i , y i ) at (x i , y * i ) and let it intersect the horizontal axis at (x * i , y i ). Note that by the single crossing property, for any two diagonal bundles there is a unique R i ∈ D s with an indifference curve containing them.
Hence, we obtain a bijection G :
i , x i ) has the least upper bound property, so does D s .
From now on, we will assume that the topology on D s is the order topology generated by the collection of open intervals of the form ( 
In this way, we construct an increasing sequence of preferences {R converges to its supremum. Since the Euclidean distance between (x, y) and
monotonically converges to zero, the supremum must be the R i such that (x, y) ∈ P E(R i , R j ). 
Discussion
In this subsection, we compare our model with that of Saporiti (2009) . He assumes a finite set of alternatives with cardinality at least three. He assumes strict orderings and that the domain is an ordered set. His definition of the single-crossing property is as follows.
Definition 12 (Saporiti (2009) 
We remark below on the differences between our model and his.
• Since we are concerned with allocations in an Edgeworth box, we do not assume finiteness of the set of alternatives. The assumption of strict preferences is also inappropriate in our model because it rules out classical preferences.
• We do not directly impose an order on the domain. Instead we provide a more primitive definition of the single-crossing property in economic environments and derive an order on the domain.
• We also do not assume an order on F (in his case, the set X). However, we show (by assuming the SCFs to be continuous in the order topology) that strategy-proofness and individual-rationality imply that F is diagonal. Since there is a natural order on diagonal sets, we, in effect derive an ordering on F .
• On a diagonal set, our notion of the single-crossing property implies the version of the property in Definition 12. It is easily verified that the SCF in Table 1 is strategy-proof, individually rational and has three elements in the range. It is not a FPT rule because all the allocations in the range lie on one side of the endowment but are not collinear. The range contains the endowment.
Consider a preference domain where aP i bP i c is not admissible for both i = 1, 2. The domain remains single-crossing although it is no longer rich. The SCF over the restricted domain is still strategy-proof and individually rational. However, the endowment is no longer in its range. This example in conjunction with our characterization result makes it clear that richness of the domain is critical in ensuring that the endowment lies in the range of the SCF.
The next example shows that agents' preferences need not be single-peaked on the range on each side of the endowment.
Example 5 Consider a rich domain of single-crossing preferences. The SCF is shown in Figure 5 . In the figure ω and d are diagonal with d ∈ F OQ i (ω). Consider a preference R * j
d). Choose another allocation c in the interior of LC(R
Consider the two line segments joining ω and c and c and d. We will define a strategy-proof and individually rational SCF F such that F = ωc ∪ cd. By the single-crossing property, T op(R j , ωc ∪ cd) ∈ {ω, d} for all R j . Define the SCF F as follows:
Since the domain of F is rich there exists R i such that x = T op(R i , ωc ∪ cd) for all x ∈ ωc ∪ cd. To see this note that the range drawn is in the interior of the Edgeworth box. The range is also compact and concave relative to agent i's origin. Arguing in the same way as in Proposition 4 we can show that there exists R i such that x = T op(R i , ωc ∪ cd) for all x ∈ ωc ∪ cd.
We claim that F is strategy-proof. Note that agent i does not have any incentive to deviate when the outcome is ω because he cannot change the outcome by changing his announcement and when the outcome is other than ω he gets his best outcome.
Agent j is not going to change her announcement when the outcome is ω because she is getting her best allocation. When the outcome is not ω she can change it to ω only. But if d = T op(R j , ωc ∪ cd), then ω is the worst allocation for agent j in ωc ∪ cd because of the single-crossing property. This SCF is also individually rational because an allocation other than ω is chosen only when both the agents are better-off relative to ω.
Observe that F is not continuous. To see this choose a profile (R 
Hence, continuity for agent j is violated.
We will show in our characterization result that if continuity is additionally imposed on the SCF, then agent preferences over the range are single-peaked on each side of the endowment. The next example shows that the range of a strategy-proof and individually rational SCF need not be piece-wise linear even if it is continuous.
Example 6 Let agent i's preferences be given by utility functions of the form u i (x i , y i ; θ i ) = θ i √ x i + y i with θ i > 0 and i = 1, 2. In Example 2, we have shown that this is a rich domain of single-crossing preferences.
Let Ω x = 8 and Ω y = 4. Let ω 1 = (4, 4 − 4 1 + y 1 = 4. In other words, T op(θ 1 , B ) is unique for every θ 1 .
For agent 2 the optimization problem is,
The first order condition is given by the equation, θ 2 = 4 3
. Note that the derivative in the right hand side of this equation is
. It is continuous and strictly positive at all x 2 ∈ (0, 8) and, hence, by the Inverse Function Theorem, the solution of x 2 is a continuous and one to one function of θ 2 . Hence, the optimal solution for y 2 given this constraint is also a continuous and one to one function of θ 2 . In other words, T op(θ 2 , B ) is unique for every θ 2 and a continuous function of θ 2 . Define the SCF F by setting,
Clearly, F = B . It is easy to see that the SCF F is strategy-proof and individually rational. Since T op(θ i , B ) is continuous for i = 1, 2, F is also continuous. Observe that in this example, we do not include the allocations ((8, 0), (0, 4)) and ((0, 4), (8, 0)) in the range. This is because for any preference of agent 2, the allocation (0, 4) and (8, 0) cannot be attained as maximum on B. We discuss this issue in more detail in Example 8. Saporiti (2009) shows that if a SCF is strategy-proof, anonymous and unanimous, then the SCF must be a Peak rule. For two agent economies, a Peak rule ensures that
s . The next example shows that in single-crossing domains as we have defined them, that a Peak rule need not be continuous. 
Clearly B = F and ω ∈ F . Note that there exists R * such that ω = T op(R * , F ). The SCF is a Peak rule because F (θ 1 , θ 2 ) ∈ median{T op(θ 1 , F ), T op(θ 2 , F ), ω)} or according to the tie-breaking rule that selects either d or d. It is also strategy-proof and individually rational. But it is not continuous for reasons similar to those in Example 5.
In our characterization, result we will assume that the range of an SCF is in the interior of ∆. Our next example shows that in the absence of this assumption characterization is hard even with the assumption of continuity of the SCFs. These examples show that if the domain of a SCF is rich and single-crossing then whether the boundary allocations of ∆ are contained in the range depends on the domain. Such complications do not arise in Barberà and Jackson (1995) because the domain in their analysis is rich enough to permit all kinds of corner allocations to be tops.
Remark 4.1:
In the light of the discussion in Example 8, we will assume F ⊂ int ∆.
A Characterization Result
In this section, we will provide a characterization of the SCFs defined on rich single-crossing domains that are strategy-proof, individually rational and continuous. 
From Definition 13, it follows that F is a GT rule then ω ∈ F . The range of a GT rule is diagonal and agent preferences are single-peaked on F on each side of the endowment. However, the range of a GT rule need not be piece-wise linear. Example 6 is an example of a GT rule. In this example the range of the SCF is not piece-wise linear. In light of Remark 4.1, we provide a characterization of GT rules with an additional assumption that F ⊂ int ∆. We will also assume that the SCF F is continuous. Hence, F is connected because D s is connected. Because of the assumption that F ⊂ int ∆ and that the range is connected, our characterization is true only if ω i (0, 0). Therefore, we will assume that ω i (0, 0) for i = 1, 2. We show that if a SCF defined on a rich single-crossing domain is strategy-proof, individually rational and continuous then it must be a GT rule.
continuous SCF such that F ⊂ int ∆ and F is a closed set. Then F is strategy-proof and individually rational if and only if it is a GT rule.
A GT rule by definition is strategy-proof and individually rational. The other direction of the proof of this result is contained in Appendix 7.In the next paragraph, we provide an overview of the steps involved in the proof.
Since we assume the SCF to be continuous and the domain is connected the range of the SCF is connected. Next we show that the range contains the endowment (Lemma 3) is diagonal (Lemma 5). Then we argue that the agents' preferences are single-peaked on the both sides of the endowment (Lemma 8). Next we show that at least one of the agents' preferences are single-peaked on the entire range (Lemma 9). Then in the next step we prove the claim of Theorem 3.4.1. With continuity of the SCF, richness and singlecrossingness we can only show that the range is diagonal, but we cannot prove it to be piecewise linear. Example 8 demonstrates this. Therefore single-peakedness on the range does not follow. We use continuity and richness of the domain to eventually conclude that both the agents' preferences are single-peaked on both sides the endowment and for at least one agent preferences are single-peaked on the entire range.
Observation 2 Nicolò (2004) examines a two-good, two-agent exchange economy with the domain of Leontief preferences.
14 He shows that the range of a strategy-proof and individually rational SCF must consist of a set of diagonal allocations containing the endowment. Our result is intermediate between the Nicolò (2004) and Barberà and Jackson (1995) result in the sense that the range of a SCF on a rich single-crossing domain (satisfying continuity) must satisfy some restrictions, but can be more general than being piece-wise linear. It must however contain the endowment, as in the other cases. Furthermore, agent preferences restricted to the range must be single-peaked on each side of the endowment.
Conclusion
In this paper, we have formulated the concept of rich single-crossing domains for a two-good exchange economies. Using mild regularity conditions we have characterized the class of strategy-proof, individually rational and continuous SCFs and identified them to be the class of Generalized Trading rules. This class is wider than the class of Fixed-Price Trading rules identified in Barberà and Jackson (1995) . However, the class is not big enough relative to the class of FPT rules. This is because, other than piecewise linearity all other properties of the FPT rules hold in the restricted domain of single-crossing preferences also. An important question for further research is whether the GT rule result can be extended to the case of an arbitrary number of agents with additional assumptions such as anonymity and non-bossiness as in Barberà and Jackson (1995) .
Proof : We first show that the endowment is in the range. This result does not require either strategy-proofness or continuity.
Proof : Since D s is rich, we know from Proposition 4 that there exists a profile (R i , R j ) such that ω ∈ P E(R i , R j ). Note that indifference curves are strictly convex. Therefore, for any allocation other than ω at the profile (R i , R j ), F will violate individual-rationality for at least one agent. Hence,
We now establish a monotonicity result with reference to the order on D s defined earlier.
Proof : By strategy-proofness,
Next we show that if a SCF is continuous, strategy-proof and individually rational, then its range is diagonal. We will denote the set {( Proof :
We will prove this Lemma by contradiction. Without the loss of generality we can assume that Figure 8 . Note that by strategy-proofness R k =R k for all k ∈ I. From Lemma 4 it follows that ifR i R i thenR j R j . We prove that ifR i R i thenR j R j . We use Lemma 4 twice, as observed by the referee.
To prove the claim letR i R i . Then by Lemma 4 it follows that
Similarly, ifR i R i thenR j R j . Therefore, without loss of generality we assume
). We will prove the Lemma with the help of eight claims.
Proof of Claim 1: We explain the argument with the help of Figure 8 . Choose R * i such that,
We can find such an R * i since D s is rich and
Since indifference curves are downward sloping, the indifference curve of
Since indifference curves of the agents are strictly convex and preferences are strictly monotonic, non-diagonal position of F (R i ,R j ) and F (R i ,R j ) imply if ω ∈ SEQ i (F (R i ,R j )) then agent j's individual-rationality at the profile (R i ,R j ) will be violated. This establishes Claim 1.
To prove the Lemma we construct a sequence of profiles {(R
converges to the boundary of ∆ along the line segment joining F (R i ,R j ) and c, (Figure 9 ). Then for large enough k we will find Figure 9 . Then by Lemma 4, F (R i , R k j ) lies in the triangular region as shown in Figure 9 which is the intersection of U C(
However, before this we need to show existence of another sequence of profiles such that,
lie on the line segment that connects a and F (R i ,R j ) for all k (Figure 9 ). Claims 2, 3 and 4 are important intermediate steps in order to construct this sequence. Define the following set,
Claim 2 shows that there exists profiles other than (R i ,R j ) that lie in A.
Claim 2: There exists
Proof of the Claim: Since F is strategy-proof The following Claim is another important step in proving the existence of the first sequence.
Proof of the Claim: The proof follows immediately by repeating the arguments that has been used to prove Claim 1. In the first step increase agent j's preference and then in the second step increase agent i's.
The following Claim in conjunction with Claim 2 and 3 will give us the desired sequence.
Claim 4: There does not exist a profile (
. Proof of the Claim: Since F is continuous A is a closed set in the order topology. Therefore set A contains all its limit points. Therefore by Claim 3 th proof follows.
Note that we do not consider any profile (R i , R j ) such as R i =R i andR j R i in the above Claims because they violate strategy-proofness.
Consider a sequence
Since each component of the sequence is strictly monotonic and bounded above they must converge to their respective supremum. Let
Define the first term of the desired sequence to be (R 1 i , R 1 j ). By Claim 3 we will obtain another sequence S 2 that con-
Let the second term of the desired sequence to be (R 2 i , R 2 j ). By continuing this process we obtain the desired sequence. Now we show how a sequence of profiles can be constructed such that its outcome belong to the vertical line that joins F (R i ,R j ) and c ( Figure 9 ) and converges to c. Along with the existence of the sequence in the previous paragraph claims 1, 5, 6, 7 and 8 are the important intermediate steps to construct this sequence.
Proof of the Claim: Assume for the sake of contradiction that this does not happen. Then
By the argument above, we can construct an increasing sequence of profiles whose outcomes lie in T HQ i (F (R i ,R j )) and which converges to (R i ,R j ). Observe that for k large enough we can choose R (Figure 9 ). Now we prove the following important claims.
Claim 6: There exists (R
picks from the line segment joining c and F (R i ,R j ).
Proof of the Claim: By Claim 5, there exists R * j
R i large enough (according the order ) individual-rationality of agent i will be violated.
By continuity of F and applying the argument of individual-rationality of agent i the proof follows.
The following Claim is important.
Claim 7: There does not exist (R * * * i , R * * * j ) (R i ,R j ) such that for all profiles greater than (R * * * i , R * * * j ), the SCF F chooses allocation off the line segment connecting c and F (R i ,R j ). Proof of the Claim: Define the set,
Consider an sequence fromÃ that converges to (R * * * i , R * * * j ). Since F is continuous (R * * * i , R * * * j ) ∈Ã. Repeating the arguments in Claim 6 it follows that for every profile (R i , R j ) (R i ,R j ) for which the SCF F chooses an allocation from the line segment joining c and F (R i ,R j ) we can find (R i , R j ) (R i , R j ) such that F (R i , R j ) lies on the line segment joining c and F (R i ,R j ). Hence, the proof follows.
Note that the outcome paths in SEQ i (F (R i ,R j )) are such that when we fix agent i's preference and change j's and then when we change i's, the latter one lies above the former. Consider the following arguments to see this. Observe that since F is continuous
Proof of the Claim: Let for the sake of contradiction
Then we will obtain two profiles (R *
) and hence by individual-rationality of F , ω ∈ SEQ i (F (R i ,R j )). This cannot happen because (R i ,R j ) and (R i ,R j ) are non-diagonal allocations. Hence, we reach a contradiction.
Moving back and forth along a single path and/or existence of an allocation on the line segment such that beyond that allocation the SCF F does not choose an allocation from the line segment are not possible. If any of these happens then for R i large enough
(according to the order ) F will violate individual-rationality for agent i because ω ∈ int F OQ i (F (R i ,R j )).
Remark 7.1: Note that we have not used closedness of F in the above Lemma.
Remark 7.2:
Since D s is connected in the order topology and F is continuous, F is connected. Hence, the diagonal property of F implies that F can be written as d ω ∪ ωd where d ∈ SEQ i (ω) and d ∈ F OQ i (ω), for some i.
The following Lemma demonstrates a relationship between the end elements of a diagonal set and single-crossing preferences.
We can choose (R
Proof : We illustrate the proof in Figure 10 .
In this figure the darker diagonal set is the range of the SCF F . Since, F ⊂ int ∆ and is closed we can find ef such that the range lies entirely below this line (from agent i's origin). 
Consider the following four cases:
The cases above shows that d / ∈ F , which is a contradiction. Hence
The following Lemma proves that agent preferences restricted to F are single-peaked on each side of the endowment. Proof : We prove the Lemma in four steps. In the first step we show that any allocation such that c ∈ d ω or c ∈ ωd can be sustained as a top in d ω or ωd respectively. In the second step we show that no agent has isolated tops on any side of the endowment. In the third step we show that both agents' preferences have unique top on both sides of the endowment. In the fourth step we show that preferences are in fact, single-peaked on both sides of the endowment.
Note that both d ω and ωd are compact. Since, preferences are continuous on each of these segments a maximum exists under all R i . In Step 1 we show that all the allocations in each side of ω can be sustained as a top under some R i .
Step 1: Let c ∈ d ω or c ∈ ωd. Then there exists R i such that c ∈ T op(R i , d ω) or c ∈ T op(R i , ωd).
Proof of
Step 1: Without the loss of generality let c ∈ ωd. Choose R i and R j such that it satisfies (1) and (2) Step 2: We use Figure 11 .
We will prove Step 2 by contradiction. Suppose F has isolated plateaus on ωd. Let a a and bb be two plateaus. Consider R * j such that int ab ⊂ LC(R * j , a) = LC(R * j , b). Choose R i and R j such that it satisfies (1) and (2) Step 3: It follows from Step 2 that agent preferences have unique plateaus on both sides of ω. We show that preferences admit unique maximal element on both sides of ω. Let a a be a plateau for some preference R * j . Note that a a ⊂ IC(R * j , a ) = IC(R * j , a). By the single-crossing property either (i) a = T op(R j , a a) or (ii) a = T op(R j , ab) for R j = R * j . The proof follows by repeating the arguments similar to the ones in Step 2.
We have proved that on both sides of the endowment each agent i has a unique top. However this is not enough to conclude that agent preferences are single-peaked. We now show this.
Step 4: Suppose for the sake of contradiction preferences are not single-peaked. We use Figure 12 .
Suppose R * j is not single-peaked but has a top on ωd. Therefore there exists an indifference curve of the preference R * j such that the indifference curve cuts ωd at least twice and T op(R * j , ωd) is in the interior of the upper contour set of this indifference curve. Let a and b be two points of intersection. Hence, under R * j there exists allocations in ωd between a and b that are in the lower contour set of the indifference curve that passes through these two allocations. Choose such an allocation c. From the Step 1 and Step 2 there exists R j such that c = T op(R j , ωd). Hence, indifference curves of R j and R * j cuts twice.
We now show that at most only one agent can have tops on both sides of the endowment. R i }. Hence, it follows that if (R i , R j ) ∈ K(2) then F (R i , R j ) ∈ ωd and if (R i , R j ) ∈ K(3) then F (R i , R j ) ∈ d ω. Now note that in both ωd and d ω preferences of agent j are also single-peaked.
Now consider K(1)∪K(2).
We know by individual-rationality of F that if (R i , R j ) ∈ K(2) then F (R i , R j ) ∈ ωd. Now we know that 
Analogously, if (R
This completes the proof of Theorem 2.
